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 1 
THE CONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION OF THE EU’S 
NEIGHBOURHOOD 
 
 
The chapter argues that the ENP has functioned as a mechanism of 
geopolitical ordering for how the EU approaches the areas immediately 
beyond its borders. It is, however, one premised on a particular mindscape 
or geospatial vision that infuses the ENP with an imperial impulse. Despite 
this, the chapter argues that the EU’s ability to order the neighbourhood is 
limited by the actions and preferences of partner countries and other 
neighbours whose constitutive capabilities should not be discounted. One 
consequence is that the geospatial construction of the neighbourhood and 
the construction of the EU more generally are mutually imbricated. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since its founding as the European Economic Community in 1957 the history of 
the European project has been one of both steadily deepening levels of integration 
and steadily expanding membership. From an original six members in 1957, the 
2004 enlargement brought the number of members to 25, with Romania, Bulgaria 
and Croatia joining subsequently. While all the enlargements have raised 
important issues, the 2004 enlargement was particularly significant. This was 
because, although debates about the Union’s continuing ability to take on new 
members have always been aired, the 2004 enlargement process resulted in a 
definitive policy stance that future enlargements would be few and far between. 
With an unprecedented ten new members to be integrated it was argued the 
Union’s borders needed to be delimited once and for all if the EU was to have any 
hope of preserving its democratic legitimacy and of remaining bureaucratically 
functional. Thus, in 2003 the European Commission (2003) issued a 
communication on the ‘Wider Europe Neighbourhood’ calling for ‘A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’. By 2004 the 
Wider Europe initiative had transformed into the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). 
 
Although enlargement was perceived as challenging the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy and bureaucratic functionality the ENP’s introduction created its own 
challenges, principal of which concerned security. Despite having gradually 
evolved its own security and defence dimensions, the EU’s primary security 
enhancing capabilities have been overwhelmingly connected to the very 
processes of further integration and enlargement (Wæver 1996; 1998). In other 
words, the promise of future enlargement and inclusion within the European club 
has been used to promote stability beyond the EU’s borders. With further 
enlargement now precluded there was therefore concern as to how stability and 
security might be maintained in future.  
 
Responding to this challenge is at the heart of the ENP, with this aspiration already 
clearly articulated in the Commission’s 2003 communication on the Wider 
Europe, which called for the EU ‘to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly 
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neighbourhood – “a ring of friends” – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and 
co-operative relations’ (European Commission 2003: 4). As will become evident, 
the mechanisms through which the ENP has sought to do this share much with the 
previous enlargement policy, focused as it is on offering a closer relationship with 
the Union in return for adherence to EU norms. However, with membership off 
the agenda the carrot is smaller, with Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) providing the closest possible 
relationship the EU presently has on offer (European Commission/High 
Representative 2015: 7). Neighbours will remain neighbours. 
 
As Schumacher (2015: 386) argues, the terminological references to ‘good 
neighbourliness’ (but also to the ‘neighbourhood’ and the ‘ring of friends’ as such) 
within the ENP reflect the EU’s perceived need for a new narrative for the post-
enlargement environment. The ENP, however, did not just respond to a perceived 
narratological absence. The chapter argues that it has also functioned as a 
supreme geopolitical constitutive act, with the naming of the ‘neighbourhood’ in 
the ENP instantiating a particular geopolitical imaginary of the nature of Europe. 
In other words, the ENP is premised on a particular geopolitical vision of what we 
might term a ‘hub-and-spoke’ Europe. In this imaginary the EU is located at the 
centre, a presumed pole of attraction and source of order (and ordering). In 
contrast, the neighbourhood – destined to remain formally excluded – appears as 
a kind of buffer zone or marchland (Browning and Joenniemi 2008: 527; Walters 
2004) to the chaos lying beyond. As will become evident, however, in the EU’s ENP 
discourse the friendliness of the neighbourhood countries cannot be taken as 
given, but is primarily related to how far they find the EU attractive and wish to 
draw closer to it via active engagement with the ENP and their appropriation of 
EU norms through it. 
 
Despite appearances, however, and despite its predominant position in respect of 
the neighbourhood, the chapter argues that the EU’s ability to impose on its 
neighbours the geopolitical imaginary of European space embedded within the 
ENP is restricted. Indeed, the fact that in 2015 the ENP was undergoing its second 
revision since its implementation in 2004 is indicative of this, with the background 
documents noting its various failures and limitations to date. The chapter 
therefore demonstrates that those in the neighbourhood have had considerable 
ability to ‘bite back’ (Parker 2000) and impact on the core. In doing so they have 
been able to exert influence on the EU, not least in terms of how it conceives of 
itself, its security environment and the very idea of Europe and Europeanness that 
underpins this. 
 
The chapter begins by outlining the EU’s geopolitical vision of Europe and its 
construction of the neighbourhood in the ENP in more detail. It then examines the 
ENP in practice, before a final section explores the ‘partners’’ role in impacting 
back on the ENP and the construction of Europe in the policy. The chapter 
concludes with a few reflections on the most recent EU documents in preparation 
for a new ENP and the extent to which they are opening up to a different vision of 
the EU’s relationship with its neighbourhood.  
 
 
 3 
Of Mindscapes and Geopolitical Imaginaries 
 
As a policy targeted at partners beyond its borders the ENP is inevitably imbued 
with a particular idealisation of European space. To this extent it betrays a 
particular mindscape and geopolitical vision. The concept of mindscape refers to 
how actors generate particular geospatial visions that come to frame both their 
perception of and responses to their environment. Once constructed they provide 
‘a mental map, a way of looking at things and one’s environment, whilst also 
becoming prescriptive of how to move through the mindscape’ (Browning and 
Lehti 2007: 695; Liulevicius 2000: 151). To this extent mindscapes perform an 
ordering function, establishing grounds upon which actors are able to understand 
the nature of the situation they face, distinguish between the ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’, and as such provide an impulse for action insofar as mindscapes entail 
a vision of what ‘ought’ to be (Eglitis 2004: 8-10). 
 
The mindscape of the ENP comprises at least four elements. First, it is premised 
on a particular teleological vision that positions the EU at the forefront of a 
universal developmental model, and representative of what is quintessentially 
‘normal’. This model is premised around open economies, de-bordering and 
democratic governance. It is assumed that this model of liberal economic and 
political governance is universally attractive, that the tide of history is going this 
way, and that this is the form of order and society to be aspired for. Intimately 
connected is the second element, which is the assumption that while the model 
itself is attractive, so too is the EU. Therefore, it is expected that outsiders will 
aspire for a closer relationship with the Union – either through membership, or 
failing that, through some form of association. Derivative of this is the third 
element, which is that the world beyond the EU’s borders is a world of risks, 
instability and insecurity. The mindscape is therefore one differentiating a safe 
inside from a potentially chaotic, threatening and ‘abnormal’ outside, an outside 
that either needs to be tamed (i.e. through the ENP) and/or kept at arms-length.  
 
Lastly, however, despite the universalist claims surrounding the EU’s 
developmental model, the ENP itself rests on a restricted and geocultural 
conception of Europeanness that is in essence highly particularist. This conception 
is evident in the subdivision of the neighbourhood into a ‘European East’ (where 
the ‘Europeanness’ of partners like Ukraine is taken for granted) and a ‘non-
European South’ (where the ‘Europeanness’ of partners like Morocco is rejected1) 
within the policy and the development of different policy instruments within the 
ENP for dealing with them -  the Eastern Partnership and the ‘Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean’.  
 
The above claims can obviously be contested at an empirical level. For instance, 
the idea that the EU has a singular developmental model to offer is open to 
question (Kurki 2013: chapter 8) and is something returned to later. The same 
applies to embedded conceptions of Europeanness, of who qualifies or does not 
qualify for inclusion in this privileged category. This is evident in internal EU 
disputes over Turkey’s European credentials, debates that often hinge on 
disagreements as to whether the core characteristics of Europeanness should be 
culturally, racially, religiously or geographically determined.  
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Setting those issues aside for the moment, the key point to note is that in turn this 
mindscape has tended to foster an imperial vision in respect of how the EU views 
its relationship with its outside, and with its neighbourhood more specifically (Del 
Sarto 2016). In short, the mindscape places the EU at the apex of a hierarchy, 
dispensing wisdom. For instance, as stated in Article 8(1) of the Treaty on 
European Union, the sense of ‘good neighbourliness’ aspired for in the ENP is to 
be generated and ‘founded on the values of the Union’. Elsewhere these values are 
stipulated in terms of ‘a shared commitment to the universal values of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law’ (European Commission/High 
Representative 2013: 14) although, as we will see, in its actual implementation the 
EU places at least as much emphasis on fostering open liberal market economies. 
The point, as Schumacher (2015: 386) notes, though, is that Article 8 refers 
‘exclusively to the values of the EU (the self) and not the other’, with this becoming 
‘an important tool in the EU’s discursive efforts of self-presentation and of 
delineating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion’. EU norms, values and practices 
are essentially seen as non-negotiable, with the ENP as such imbued with an 
imperial impulse – to reproduce itself on the outside while keeping the borders 
between inside and outside in place. 
 
The notion that the mindscape of the ENP entails an imperial impulse is important 
and can be contrasted with other geopolitical visions often ascribed to the EU, be 
it of the EU coalescing into a unified Westphalian state-like actor with a unified 
and impermeable border regime, a currency and army etc., or of the EU promoting 
the postmodern neomedievalisation of Europe into an area of multidimensional 
overlapping spaces and networks (Browning 2005). Elements of all three can 
arguably be detected in the ENP but an imperial vision of the Union extending its 
influence, norms and practices beyond its borders is arguably the overriding 
impulse (see Browning and Joenniemi 2008).  
 
 
The ENP in ‘Imperial’ Practice 
 
While the mindscape sketched above emphasises the EU as a beacon and agent of 
(imperial) transformation, this imperative is further supported by two other 
important constitutive narratives related to the EU as a peace project and the 
integration-security dilemma raised by the decision to delimit final borders for 
the Union. Starting with the second, the challenge facing the EU has been how to 
avoid alienating its neighbours, how to promote reform within them, and how to 
avoid the EU’s external border becoming a line of exclusion and negative othering 
now that enlargement is off the agenda. As Jeandesboz (2007) argues, in the 
debates framing the constitution of the ENP this has essentially translated into the 
neighbourhood being viewed as a source of threats to the EU and the need to avoid 
any negative spill-over into the Union. Such threats have generally been 
understood in terms of illegal immigration, terrorism, organised crime, 
communicable diseases and social ills associated with poverty. With the 
disciplining mechanism of enlargement off the agenda the outside has therefore 
become a space to be kept outside and guarded against, but also managed in such 
a way as to keep it friendly (Pardo 2004: 735). As such, instead of establishing a 
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Westphalian border of total exclusion, Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005: 19, 25-6) 
argue the emphasis has been on turning the neighbourhood into a buffer zone. The 
ENP therefore seeks to blur the border with the neighbours in some spheres of 
activity as a way of making them responsible for controlling their borders furthest 
from the Union, thereby pushing the threatening outside further away. 
 
This security imperative driving engagement with the neighbours is, in turn, 
supported by a deeper ontological narrative of self-identity that depicts the EU as 
fundamentally a project for bringing peace and stability to the continent. This has 
created a sense of moral imperative and duty determining that the EU cannot be 
self-satisfied with its own internal achievements. Instead, it also needs to organize 
the space beyond its borders, spreading European values in a broader effort of 
creating a ‘Europe whole and free’ (Browning and Joenniemi 2008: 524, 532; 
Schumacher 2015: 384-5). 
 
In practical terms the ENP has been designed to respond to these imperatives by 
offering the ‘opportunity of closer economic integration with the EU and the 
prospect of increased access to the EU’s Internal Market’ in return for ‘the 
implementation of challenging political, economic and institutional reforms, and 
a commitment to common values’ (European Commission/High Representative 
2015: 2). The EU emphasizes it is not seeking to ‘impose a model or a ready-made 
recipe for political reform’ and has argued that the ENP can be differentiated to 
respond to the partners’ different ambitions (European Commission/High 
Representative 2011: 2-3). EU discourse on the ENP is therefore replete with 
notions of voluntarism, while asserting that in principle everything is possible bar 
institutions (i.e. membership).  
 
Even so, the ENP’s normative aspirations are clear. Thus, in 2011 the ENP’s 
commitment to transformative change in the neighbourhood was upgraded to an 
emphasis on promoting, not just democracy, but ‘deep democracy’ (European 
Commission/High Representative 2011). As Kurki notes, deep democracy seems 
to combine a concern with institutions and elections with a more wholesale 
‘reform of societies’ economic, civic, cultural and political structures’. Indeed, she 
argues that the policy is becoming notably embedded with neoliberal preferences 
and tendencies insofar as the policy increasingly emphasizes economic rights and 
calls for economic liberalization (Kurki 2013: 153-4). The latter is evident, for 
example, in the more recent advent of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
and visa free regimes for the most willing partners (European Commission/High 
Representative 2015: 2). 
 
However, while there is nothing forced about the ENP, the policy strapline that the 
ENP offers ‘more for more’ (a closer relationship in return for more change) is 
clearly designed as a form of strategic leverage premised on the EU’s continuing 
reliance on principles of conditionality that have served it well in the enlargement 
process. As the European Commission puts it: ‘Increased EU support to its 
neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating 
democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and faster a country 
progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU’. The 
carrot of ‘more’ EU is therefore seen to offer leverage over the partners, while the 
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flip side of conditionality is not simply that those who fail to reform will get less, 
but that ‘where reform has not taken place, the EU will reconsider or even reduce 
funding’ (European Commission/High Representative 2011: 3). Such progress (or 
lack thereof) is measured against Action Plans (or Association Agendas for those 
partners who have signed AAs) that the partner countries are required to 
negotiate and agree with the Commission on an individual bilateral basis. By 
constituting the ENP around a set of carrots and sticks the EU is therefore 
establishing criteria and conditions that the partners need to meet to become fully 
embedded as part of the EU’s ‘ring of friends’. 
 
Therefore, despite the voluntarism the EU’s prescription of norms and emphasis 
on conditionality as an enforcement mechanism in the ENP does inscribe the 
policy with hierarchical and imperial tendencies. Thus, there is little doubt as to 
who is expected to learn from whom, or of the fact that the EU positions itself as 
more advanced and temporally ahead on a range of measures. This makes the 
frequent references to ‘joint ownership’ and ‘partnership’ in ENP documents 
disingenuous. Reflecting on the EU’s relationship with Ukraine in the ENP, Kurki 
(2013: 165) therefore notes that there has been notably little discussion of what 
‘shared values’ like democracy might mean, with the EU largely ‘dictating to 
Ukraine’ democracy support requirements in a manner ‘which is clearly not in line 
with pluralism or debate’. 
 
This approach has not been entirely successful. As the Commission itself has 
noted, the ‘more for more’ strategy ‘has not always contributed to an atmosphere 
of equal partnership, and has not always been successful in providing incentives 
[for] further reforms in the partner countries’ (European Commission/High 
Representative 2015: 4). Indeed, it is reasonable to wonder whether an equal 
partnership is even feasible in a situation where the values to be promoted have 
been predetermined by the more powerful party. The approach, however, also has 
other constitutive effects. For instance, it has the effect of promoting a hierarchy 
of otherness, with this operating in two respects. First, at the broadest level the 
ENP’s very existence is indicative that the partners of the neighbourhood are 
viewed, not only as geographically closer to the EU than those that lie at a greater 
distance, but also potentially as normatively more similar (or able to be made so). 
However, whilst their status as (potential) ‘friends’ is what draws them closer, it 
also constitutes their otherness, not least by designating them as more foreign 
than the few remaining prospective candidate countries for membership, though 
arguably less foreign than those that are not part of the ENP. 
 
Second, though, in providing for differentiation between partners the 
conditionality mechanism also has the potential of constituting ENP countries as 
being more or less friendly/threatening to the EU relative to each other depending 
on their willingness to buy into the ENP’s normative transformative vision. In 
short, friendliness in the ENP is primarily related to how far the partners find the 
EU attractive and wish to draw closer to it via active engagement. The danger is 
that this reduces friend-threat calculations down to assessments of others’ desire 
to become like us and the EU’s ability to reproduce itself on its outside (Browning 
and Christou 2010: 112). This is also significant in that insofar as the ENP is 
embedded with a mindscape that assumes the universal attraction of both the 
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values the EU claims to stand for and of the EU itself, then any rejection of the ENP 
(or failure to actively embrace its transformative agenda) is liable to pose an 
ontological challenge to the EU by questioning the EU’s own self-understanding as 
a model to be aspired for and emulated by all. 
 
 
The Constitutive Power of Neighbours 
 
This last point is significant as it suggests that although the mindscape of the ENP 
is impregnated with a normatively imperializing geopolitical vision, with the EU 
seeking to expand its influence beyond its border by normalizing its conception of 
good governance for those beyond, this is actually a two-way relationship, with 
the EU also vulnerable to the partners’ actions. This is to say that the partners also 
have constitutive power to impact on the nature of the ENP, and therefore on 
conceptions of the nature of the border, the EU’s sense of self-understanding and 
its perception of the security environment it faces. As Parker (2000; 2008) puts it, 
marginal actors often have the capacity to ‘bite back’: often in unanticipated ways. 
For instance, the very fact that the ENP presumes that the EU is sufficiently 
attractive that the partners will sign up to its preconditions, even despite the 
carrot of membership having been withdrawn, assigns the partners a power of 
‘recognition/non-recognition’. While active engagement with the ENP signifies 
recognition and an endorsement of EU conceptions of self-identity as a benevolent 
peace project, non/restricted-recognition via limited engagement and enthusiasm 
for the ENP puts such claims in question.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that in EU discourse the partners have increasingly 
become located along a spectrum from willing to unwilling others depending on 
their acceptance of the ENP’s Europeanizing agenda. One consequence of this is 
that the partners’ differential willingness to respond to the EU’s overtures in the 
ENP has impacted on the openness and reciprocity the EU is willing to 
countenance with its neighbourhood partners. For example, despite rejections of 
its Europeanness the EU has been willing to reward Morocco with participation in 
various EU programmes, a mobility partnership and a DCFTA, a level of 
engagement that has so far eluded some of the other partners. As such, through its 
attempts at extending EU norms of governance the ENP has not resulted in 
uniform borders, but significant plurality. Moreover, the character of the 
neighbourhood as a buffer zone to that which lies beyond has also tended to take 
on a different complexion between the eastern and southern dimensions of the 
policy insofar as the ‘European aspirations’ of some of the Eastern partners (e.g. 
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) remain acknowledged in their respective AAs, while 
such possibilities go unmentioned in agreements with the southern partners. 
 
The EU has therefore begun to talk about the need for the ENP to embrace ‘some 
kind of variable geometry with different kinds of relationships for those partners 
that choose different levels of engagement’ (original emphasis) (European 
Commission/High Representative 2015: 7), thereby explicitly acknowledging the 
ability of the partners to frame the EU’s geometry at its borders. However, as the 
EU has also been forced to acknowledge, it is not only the partners that have this 
capacity, but those beyond as well. Thus, the EU has recognized that other actors 
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have also become increasingly involved in the region (not least Turkey and 
Russia), which ‘may also make the EU less attractive as a model and partner’. This, 
it is now noted, ‘will require the EU to reflect on how to have a more multilateral 
policy approach, involving and working with, more systematically than it does 
now, the other actors working in the neighbourhood in addressing, together with 
partner countries themselves, issues of shared interest’ (European 
Commission/High Representative 2013: 22). The top-down imperial mindscape 
and geopolitical vision of the ENP therefore encounters significant obstacles on 
the ground. This can be further demonstrated with a more direct comparison of 
the ENP in both the southern and eastern parts of the neighbourhood. 
 
As noted, the EU has never seriously considered the southern partners of the ENP 
as (potential) European countries. As such, their otherness and non-inclusion as 
members has been presumed from the start. At the same time, this constitutive 
move is reinforced by the fact that (aside from Morocco in the 1980s) the southern 
partners also have not expressed any aspiration for membership, let alone 
constituted their own self-identities in terms of Europeanness.  
 
On its inception, however, it was also clear that in the post-9/11 context questions 
of security dominated EU concerns with respect to the south in the ENP. A key 
question was therefore how the EU would use the ENP to address the various 
security problems it saw as emanating from the region. In this respect, Malmvig 
(2006) notes that historically EU policy towards the Mediterranean has tended to 
be driven by a tension between contradictory security discourses. The liberal 
security discourse has emphasized the promotion of democracy and human rights, 
the belief being that the absence of democracy, the rule of law, basic freedoms and 
economic growth has created fertile ground for the emergence of threats of 
terrorism, radicalization, migration and organized crime. Thus, from this 
perspective the very existence of authoritarian regimes in the region, and their 
reliance on cronyism, corruption, repression and violence, is central to the 
problem that needs to be tackled. Diametrically opposed to this is what Malmvig 
terms a cooperative security discourse that sees these authoritarian regimes as 
partners in tackling common challenges of terrorism, radicalism, WMD, organized 
crime, illegal migration etc. The record, particularly since 9/11, Malmvig 
contends, suggests that the EU has generally prioritized stability and regime 
security over promoting democracy and human rights, the suggestion being that 
the prospects of the ENP promoting transformation in the southern 
neighbourhood have therefore been slim.  
 
Importantly, the southern partners have themselves reinforced this view and the 
cautious approach the ENP initially adopted. Thus, although a closer relationship 
with the EU is perceived as offering a number of (mainly economic) benefits, the 
ENP’s references to democratization and transformation are viewed suspiciously, 
and even as a source of threat to regime security. Hence, while the ENP speaks of 
the need for cooperation in matters of security, it is not always clear that the EU 
and its partner regimes in the south identify threats in the same way. These 
tensions over security perceptions have impacted on the potential impact of the 
ENP and have affected the nature and logic of the neighbourhood border zone 
created. In the south the border has therefore been primarily viewed by the EU as 
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a border between safety and threat and as a line of control and exclusion, the EU 
goal essentially being one driven by logics of ‘containment’ (Walters 2004: 692).  
 
It is important to note that the first revision of the ENP took place in 2011 in the 
wake of the ‘Arab spring’ and was to a large degree inspired by it. Acknowledging 
the limited successes of the original ENP in ‘incentivizing authoritarian regimes in 
the south to embark on wide-ranging political and economic reforms’, 
(Schumacher 2015: 382) Schumacher argues that the new ENP sought to place 
greater emphasis on the liberal security discourse of democratization. Thus, 
Stefan Füle, the Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, stated 
shortly after the overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia that, ‘the assumption 
that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region … [was]… 
short-termism’ (quoted in Schumacher 2015: 387-8). There was clearly a sense, 
therefore, that the Arab spring might be capitalized upon. The subsequent 
retrenchment of the presumed ‘democratic’ uprisings, the reassertion of 
authoritarian rule in many of the southern partners, the intensification of the 
trans-Mediterranean migration crisis, the civil wars in Libya, Syria and the rise of 
ISIL, however, has considerably dampened the initial optimism of 2011. Thus, ENP 
progress reports with respect to the southern neighbourhood continue to be 
notable for their recognition of a lack of progress in implementing the ENP’s 
agenda of normative transformation. 
 
In comparison the EU’s approach to the eastern neighbourhood looks subtly 
different. One major reason for this concerns the fact that the Europeanness of the 
eastern partners is not questioned and their membership aspirations 
acknowledged in various of the AAs. More than this, though, for the most part the 
eastern partners have also sought to strategically mobilize their Europeanness in 
ways arguably uncomfortable for the Union. Thus, while the EU has seen the ENP 
as offering an alternative to membership, several of the eastern partners have 
refused to let the issue lie. Continually asserting their European credentials – be it 
culturally or through gradual economic and democratic transformation as 
stipulated in the ENP Action Plans – has been a way to keep enlargement on the 
agenda.  
 
There are parallels here to the 2004 EU enlargement process, where 
Schimmelfennig (2004) argues the prospective members were able to keep 
enlargement on the agenda by consistently referring to the EU’s own constitutive 
discourse as a peace project open to all in Europe. Failure to enlarge, he suggests 
would have spurred an ontological crisis for the EU. In a similar vein, the leaders 
of Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004-2005 presented the revolution as 
indicative of their European credentials, with these claims endorsed by EU 
leaders. Likewise, Ukrainian leaders have insisted that their signing of an 
Association Agreement with the EU would be ‘without prejudice’ to their further 
European aspirations (Runner 2008). Thus, while the eastern partners are 
implicitly depicted as lagging behind, and therefore as somewhat ‘inferior’ and 
‘backward’, they have managed to avoid being excluded as such with the potential 
still to become fully European via membership (Tiirmaa-Klaar 2006) 
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There is, however, another important element at play in the eastern 
neighbourhood, and which concerns important changes to the geopolitical 
landscape since the ENP first emerged as a consequence of Russia’s increasing 
assertiveness. The result is that the ENP is no longer the only game in town, with 
a choice of models now available to states in the neighbourhood. To be sure, 
Russia’s assertiveness also entails a carrot and stick approach. The stick has been 
seen in the context of its military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent and ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
– all events sparked by concerns in Moscow about what they see as key states in 
their own sphere of influence/near abroad (a more pejorative label for 
neighbourhood perhaps) orienting too closely to the West. The carrot, by contrast, 
is evident in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) as a competitor 
to the ENPs Eastern Partnership.  
 
The result has been a certain amount of recognition that the eastern 
neighbourhood has become a zone of geopolitical competition between the EU and 
Russia for the attentions of the region’s states. The fact, for example, that at the 
last minute Armenia did not sign the agreements it had negotiated with the EU for 
an AA/DCFTA, but instead decided to join Russia’s EEU, demonstrates that the EU 
cannot presume its power of attraction will win out in this competition (European 
Commission/High Representative 2014: p.5). As the EU notes, for the partners 
‘there is a choice to be made’ because joining the EEU precludes further 
integration with the EU through a DCFTA (European Commission/High 
Representative 2013: 22). However, while stated as such this can sound slightly 
threatening or admonishing to the partners as they make their decision, the flip 
side is that it also stands as an injunction for the EU to offer sufficiently attractive 
carrots if it does not wish the eastern neighbourhood to fall ever more under 
Russian influence. It is therefore notable, not only that the EU signed an AA with 
Ukraine on 27 June 2014, just over a month after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
but that it also asserted that ‘the Association Agreement does not constitute the 
final goal in the EU-Ukraine cooperation’ (European Commission/High 
Representative 2014: 3). Membership, therefore, potentially remains on the 
agenda. What this suggests, however, is that the eastern partners possess 
considerable leverage as, in different ways, the EU and Russia compete for their 
attentions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The chapter has argued that the ENP has served an important geopolitical 
constitutive function, re-imagining Europe in terms of an EU core, surrounded by 
a buffer zone of a so-called ‘ring of friends’, beyond which lies a more threatening 
world. The ENP has therefore aspired to be a policy of geopolitical ordering. It has 
also been argued that the mindscape underpinning the ENP has imbued it with an 
imperial geopolitical impulse as a result of the EU’s assumption that its norms, 
values and practices – and therefore the EU itself – are inherently attractive and 
desired by others. The ENP therefore results in the border with the partners being 
blurred to some extent, but with this border now appearing akin to a colonial 
frontier in which the EU projects itself into the space beyond, pacifying and 
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assimilating it to a degree by defining the bounds of appropriate behavior and 
practice (Walters 2004: 687). However, insofar as the mindscape of the ENP 
differentiates the neighbourhood into an eastern ‘European’ zone and a southern 
‘non-European’ zone it also provides the buffer zone of the neighbourhood with a 
differentiated character, and where in the south a threat-defence mindset appears 
more in evidence. 
 
However, it has been shown that the neighbours also have considerable ability to 
‘bite back’: by their power of (non-)recognition, their willingness or otherwise to 
endorse the EU’s transformative normative agenda, and not least, their ability to 
play the EU off against contending visions offered by those beyond the 
neighbourhood. Insofar as they do this they are able to impact on the nature of 
Europe in construction, the nature of its borders of inclusion/exclusion, and the 
bases upon which conceptions of security/threat are defined. What is certainly 
clear is that the positions of the neighbours have resulted in a much more 
variegated ENP than was initially outlined by the EU, and one in which it has 
become relevant to speak of an emerging variable geometry along the EU’s 
borders. 
 
In conclusion, and writing in a context in which the ENP is undergoing its second 
round of revisions since its initial framing in 2003/2004, a few words about the 
possible future of the ENP are merited. Most notable, perhaps, is that there is much 
more soul searching evident in the most recent EU documents released in 
preparation for the new ENP than at other times. Previous documents, for 
example, have often noted the limited progress of partners in implementing the 
reform agendas agreed in their individual action plans, but with the response 
essentially being that the partners must therefore try harder to meet ‘their 
commitment to achieving the objectives jointly agreed with the EU’ (European 
Commission/High Representative 2013: 21). 2  Statements released in 2015, 
however, suggest a more reflective view is becoming dominant. For example, a 
joint consultation paper on behalf of the Commission and the High Representative 
recognizes that the ENP ‘has not always been able to offer adequate responses… 
to the changing aspirations of our partners’, that ‘not all partners seem equally 
interested in a special partnership with the EU under the model of pluralism and 
integration’, and that, ‘[t]he approach of “more for more”… has not always been 
successful in providing incentives’ (European Commission/High Representative 
2015: 2, 4). This shows clear recognition that the EU’s power of attraction – 
particularly in view of the economic crisis affecting the Eurozone – may have 
diminished, but also that the conditionality mechanism is not working. Indeed, the 
document goes on to acknowledge ‘[t]he lack of a sense of shared ownership’ 
(European Commission/High Representative 2015: 4) on the part of the partners, 
a point further reflected in Commissioner Johannes Hahn’s desire ‘to see a more 
equal partnership’ (quoted in European Commisssion 2015). As the European 
Commission/High Representative (2015: 9) put it, there is a need to enhance the 
sense of shared ownership and to develop ways of working ‘that are seen as more 
respectful by partners and demonstrate a partnership of equals’.  
 
Such reflections are welcome. They indicate understanding that the EU no longer 
gets to unilaterally set the agenda of the future of Europe and there is a certain 
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amount of self-realisation that the EU can appear arrogant, imposing and 
imperialistic to outsiders. Whether their goals can be realized is, however, a more 
difficult proposition. This is because, despite the apparent mea culpa evident in 
such statements, it is also the case that the EU continues to remain deeply attached 
to its reformist agenda in its neighbourhood. How willing, therefore, is the EU 
likely to be in developing a genuinely equal dialogue with respect to the very 
framing of the values and norms that should underpin the ENP? This is not a 
technical question, but one that gets right to the heart of core elements of the EU’s 
raison d’être and sense of self. Opening up such questions therefore highlights 
precisely the extent to which the (de)construction of the neighbourhood and the 
(de)construction of the EU itself are mutually implicated. 
 
 
1 This reflects historical practice. For instance, in 1987 Morocco’s application for membership 
was rejected simply on the grounds of it not being a European country (Neumann 1998). 
2  Insofar as the EU has engaged in introspection this has been confined to largely technical 
reflections as to whether the ENP instruments and mechanisms might be tweaked (European 
Commission/High Representative 2013: 21). 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Browning, C. S. (2005) ‘Westphalian, Imperial, Neomedieval: The Geopolitics of Europe 
and the role of the North’, in Browning, C. S. (ed.) Remaking Europe in the Margins: 
Northern Europe after the Enlargements, Aldershot: Ashgate, 85-101. 
 
Browning, C. S. and Christou, G. (2010) ‘The constitutive power of outsiders: The 
European neighbourhood policy and the eastern dimension’, Political Geography 29(2): 
109-18. 
 
Browning, C. S. and Joenniemi, P. (2008) ‘Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy’, European Journal of International Relations 14(3): 519-52. 
 
Browning, C. S. and Lehti, M. (2007) ‘Beyond East-West: Marginality and National Dignity 
in Finnish Identity Construction’, Nationalities Papers 35(4): 691-716. 
 
Del Sarto, R. A. (2016) ‘Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, 
and the Arab Spring’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54(2): 215-32. 
 
Del Sarto, R. A. and Schumacher, T. (2005) ‘From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the 
European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?’ European 
Foreign Affairs Review 10(1): 17-38. 
 
Eglitis, D. S. (2004) Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity and Revolution in Latvia, 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.  
 
European Commission (2015) Press Release – Towards a new European Neighbourhood 
Policy: the EU launches a consultation on the future of its relations with neighbouring 
countries, Brussels: 4 March 2013. 
 
                                                        
 13 
                                                                                                                                                              
European Commission (2003) Wider Europe Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Brussels: COM (2003) 104 final. 
 
European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (2015) Joint Consultation Paper: Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy, 
Brussels: JOIN (2015) 6 final. 
 
European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (2014) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Neighbourhood at the 
Crossroads: Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013, Brussels: JOIN 
(2014) 12 final. 
 
European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (2013) Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Working Towards a Stronger Partnership, Brussels: JOIN (2013) 4 
final. 
 
European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (2011) A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels: COM (2011) 303. 
 
Jeandesboz, J. (2007) ‘Labelling the “neighbourhood”: towards a genesis of the European 
neighbourhood policy’, Journal of International Relations and Development 10(4): 387-
416. 
 
Kurki, M. (2013) Democratic Futures: Revisioning democracy promotion, London 
Routledge. 
 
Liulevicius, V. (2000) War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and 
German Occupation in World War I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Malmvig, H. (2006) ‘Caught between Cooperation and Democratization: The Barcelona 
Process and the EU’s Double-Discursive Approach’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development 9(4): 343-70. 
 
Neumann, I. B. (1998) ‘European Identity, EU Expansion and the Integration/Exclusion 
Nexus’, Alternatives 23(3): 397-416 
 
Pardo, S. (2004) ‘Europe of Many Circles: European Neighbourhood Policy’, Geopolitics 
9(3): 731-7. 
 
Parker, N. (2008) A Theoretical Introduction: Spaces, Centers and Margins’, in Parker, N. 
(ed.) The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins, Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 3-23. 
 
Parker, N. (2000) ‘Integrated Europe and its “margins”: action and reaction’, in Parker, N. 
and Armstrong, B. (eds.) Margins in European Integration, Houndmills: Macmillan, 3-27. 
 
Runner, P. (2008) ‘Brussels to recognize European aspirations of post-Soviet states’, 
www.euobserver.com/24/27167, 24/11/08. Accessed November 2008. 
 
 14 
                                                                                                                                                              
Schimmelfennig, F. (2004) The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schumacher, T. (2015) ‘Uncertainty at the EU’s borders: narratives of EU external 
relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy towards the southern 
borderlands’, European Security 24(3): 381-401. 
 
Tiirmaa-Klaar, H. (2006) ‘EU’s Governance Methods in its Neighbourhood Policy’,  paper 
presented at the CEEISA annual conference, Tartu, 27-27 June. 
 
Wæver, O. (1996) ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1): 
103-32. 
 
Wæver, O. (1998) ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West-European Non-War  
Community’, in Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (eds.) Security Communities, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 69-118.  
Walters, W. (2004) ‘The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective’, 
Geopolitics 9(3): 674-98. 
 
